As a result, what has been a tenuous equilibrium of “no deal, no crisis” could prove unsustainable. and its allies in the Middle East, either directly or through its own regional partners. For its part, Tehran will almost certainly step up nuclear advances, as well as provocations aimed at the U.S. It is likely that Washington will increasingly emphasise sanctions enforcement and expansion, perhaps with growing buy-in from European allies and buttressed by the threat of force, especially if there are signs – absent for the moment – of Iranian moves toward building a nuclear weapon. If efforts to restore the JCPOA drag on or, worse, fall apart, the default positions of both the U.S. But with Iran’s program closer to weaponisation capability than it has ever been, and operating with increasing opacity, the situation could well escalate into a nuclear proliferation crisis unless the parties move on to a more stable course. In Washington, the political liability of pursuing a contentious deal increases with growing pushback from the agreement’s opponents and Iran’s irreversible nuclear advancements, while the no-deal status quo has yet to become a top-tier foreign policy priority amid other crises. commitments to sanctions relief, which many think will end up delivering ephemeral returns, even if they are significant in the near term. In Tehran, sentiment is bullish about the country’s ability to weather the impact of sanctions and bearish about the value of U.S. While compromise and seeing the Vienna talks through to a successful conclusion remains in all parties’ best interest, the goal of restoring mutual compliance with the original deal may remain beyond reach, in which case an inexorable drift toward a post-JCPOA reality looms.
What is certain, however, is that escalatory measures or unexpected events could scotch what may prove to be the last chance at salvaging the JCPOA. With little sign of Iranian flexibility and growing reluctance among Democrats to engage in a polarising Iran debate in Congress ahead of midterm elections, an imminent breakthrough appears unlikely.
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have exchanged a series of counter-proposals, but prospects for reaching a consensus document are uncertain. In early August, the EU tabled a compromise text after several days of deliberations with all sides. Recent moves offered a glimmer of hope that the deal might be revived, but that now appears to be flickering. and the three European parties (France, Germany and the UK, or the E3) oppose the idea of doing so. But calling it off would run contrary to the agency’s mandate for nuclear accountability, and the U.S.
Iran also wants the IAEA investigation into its past work terminated, insisting that it could become a never-ending, politically motivated inquest. The Biden White House has indicated it cannot meet such a demand, because the administration cannot legally bind successor presidents in the way that Iran wishes. administration reneging on the deal like Trump’s did, Iran seeks guarantees that the economic dividends afforded by the restored JCPOA will endure. But the IAEA investigation stalled and the sides have become mired in disputes over issues that they had thought resolved or close to it.Īt the stalemate’s core stand Iran’s bottom-line demands that the others cannot or will not satisfy. In parallel, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed on a framework for settling outstanding questions concerning Iran’s past activities at undeclared sites.
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would provide and sketched out how to sequence the two sides’ commitments.
It laid out how Iran would roll back its nuclear program consistent with the JCPOA’s limits, gave an approximation of what sanctions relief the U.S.
The text hammered out as of March addressed almost all the substantive issues separating the parties. If so, the parties will need to pivot to a stopgap combination of single-measure agreements and respect for red lines to manage the risk of armed confrontation. But the negotiations might drag on, or the gaps prove unbridgeable. If the parties take no escalatory measures, they may be able to cross the finish line prior to or after the November vote. midterm elections narrow space for progress. The EU is trying to find a compromise, but its top diplomat believes that the parties are diverging, making a quick deal seem unlikely. Since then, things have backslid: Russia’s Ukraine war has shifted world powers’ focus and hampered cooperation disagreements between Tehran and Washington on key issues are deadlocked. By March 2022, they had yielded a close to final text. Negotiations between Iran and its interlocutors – the U.S., France, the UK, Russia, China and Germany, coordinated by the EU – made progress over eight rounds in Vienna. Since April 2021, parties to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, have sought to revive the agreement abandoned by U.S.
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